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ABSTRACT  
This paper is an attempt to develop a model that explores the factors that affect the frequency of violations of information 
security policies (ISPs). Additionally, it examines the moderating effect of cultural attributes on the frequency of ISP 
violations. Does national culture affect the way managers and employees perceive and practice ISPs? If we understand why 
ISPs are violated, perhaps we can deter future violations before they occur.  We look at three groups of factors and the impact 
they have on the frequency of violations of ISPs.  The factors examined are 1) the individual characteristics and capabilities 
of employees, 2) the information security policy (ISP) itself and 3) management issues.  Finally, the study examines the 
moderating effect of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, and power distance) 
on the proposed model.   
Keywords  
Culture, ISP Violations, Conceptual Model.  
INTRODUCTION 
Is implementing technical solutions for security enough for a company to limit their exposure to security risks?  Research 
tells us the answer is a definitive no, but technical solutions do have a role to play in security.  Whitman (2003) states that 
“we often overlook the human solutions and instead opt for technology solutions, when in fact the human factors must be 
addressed first, with technology assisting in the enforcement of desired human behaviors.” Son and Rhee (2007) report that 
Mitnick and Simon (2002) state that people who interact with the information assets of an organization are “truly security’s 
weakest link”.  Son and Rhee (2007) suggest that “an organization’s employees constitute one of its most significant security 
risks.”  The 5th Annual Global State of Information Security report (Berinato, 2007) is based on a study conducted online 
from March 6, 2007 through May 4 , 2007 in which  7200 CEOs, CFOs, CIOs, CSOs, VPs and directors of IT and IS, and 
security and IT professionals from more than 100 countries responded. In this study, for the first time, employees beat out 
hackers as the most likely source of a security incident.  In some ways, this doesn’t make sense when we learn from the 
report how much companies have increased their security precautions.  They have added processes (57 percent have an 
overall security strategy up from 37 percent three years ago), deployed technology (including firewalls, intrusion detection 
infrastructure and use of encryption), and increased the number of Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) and Chief 
Security Officers (CSOs) hired.  In fact, “out of every IT dollar spent, 15 cents goes to security”, but security isn’t improving.  
What has improved is the ability to capture and report data on security breaches (Berinato, 2007).  Son and Rhee (2007) 
suggest that more research needs to be conducted to advance our knowledge of how to effectively manage human functions 
to improve the security performance of an organization.  Understanding why security breaches take place helps in preventing 
violations of ISPs. 
There are two primary objectives of this study. The first one is to examine factors that influence employees to respect or 
violate ISPs. The second objective is to explore the moderating impact of cultural attributes on the relationship between these 
factors and the frequency of ISP violations. To achieve these objectives, this paper will focus on a few countries that 
represent a variety of cultural sets. With the diffusion of the Internet and increase in e-commerce and outsourcing practices 
around the globe, the results of the study will be of great value to management around the globe.   
LITERATURE REVIEW AND FORMULATION OF HYPOTHESES 
The Individual Characteristics and Capabilities Factor 
The individual characteristics and capabilities factor combines employees’ awareness of the security policy, the level of 
technical skills of the employee, how much employees feel they are trusted and their willingness to trust others, the 
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employees’ sensitivity to and respect for privacy issues, their level of individual ethics, and their level of accountability or 
feeling of responsibility.  Individual and situational characteristics do influence ethical behavior intentions (Banerjee, 
Cronan, and Jones, 1998).  If employees are not aware of the security policy, do not understand what it means from a 
technical perspective, feel they are highly trusted, do not respect privacy issues, have low levels of individual ethics, and low 
levels of accountability, then they are more apt to violate the policy.  Adopting the company’s information security policy 
(ISP) begins with the employees’ awareness of information security practices.   Ryan (2007) suggests that “the absence of 
awareness from appropriate training channels yields insufficient outcomes.”  He reports that no study has yielded a consensus 
information security awareness measurement.  He examines a measurement that contains technology perception of 
information security awareness, policy perception of information security awareness, and threat-context perception of 
information security awareness.  He found that the three information security awareness factors had positive correlations with 
both personal innovativeness and computer self-efficacy.  Results of a study conducted by Peslak (2007) establish that merely 
having read a code of ethics can improve ethical moral judgments in certain situations.  We posit the following: 
H1:  Awareness, education, and training programs are negatively correlated with the number of ISP violations. 
However, awareness by itself is not enough to consistently lower the frequency of security breaches.  In cases where 
employees may be aware of the policy, they may not have sufficient technical education to understand what the policy means.  
Training programs that increase both awareness of the ISP and further understanding of technology so that the ISP can be 
understood will decrease the frequency of ISP violations that occur.  Training programs should include scenarios that include 
all aspects of the ISP such as what can happen if you download “free” software and examples of how downloading free 
software has compromised security at other companies.  We posit the following: 
H2:  The level of technical skills of employees is negatively correlated with the number of ISP violations. 
Beyond awareness and understanding of technology, individual characteristics of the level of trust, sensitivity to privacy, 
ethics, and accountability need to be taken into consideration.   The more an individual trusts someone else the more likely 
they are to violate ISPs.  Trust has been measured by whether or not an employee will disclose a password to a secure 
system.  (Slay, 2003)  She posits that when considering trust and its effect on information security, other factors including 
attitude to authority, attitude to age and youth, value of loyalty and previous working relationship, formality in relationship, 
and gender differences need to be taken into consideration. An employee may hold trust in higher regard than they do the 
ISP.  If that is the case, they will ignore the policy and share their password with a co-worker.  They will do this because they 
trust that co-worker.  We posit the following: 
H3:  Trust of employees is positively correlated with the number of ISP violations. 
Privacy refers to the privacy of personal data and is generally referred to as information privacy.  In this study we are 
interested in how sensitive an individual is to protecting information about themselves as well as the identity of others.  In the 
Global State of Information Security report (Berinato, 2007), it is reported that 22 percent of all companies surveyed employ 
a Chief Privacy Officer (CPO).  Sixty percent of survey respondents posted privacy policies internally, only 24 percent 
posted policies on their external websites, and only 28 percent audited their privacy standards through a third party.  In An 
Introduction to Computer Security:  The NIST Handbook (1995) a section is included entitled “Computer Security is 
Constrained by Societal Factors.”  Rules, laws, and regulations may cause security to be increased or decreased.  They state 
that “security and workplace privacy can conflict.”  Governments may require the flow of certain information that others 
would consider an invasion of privacy.  Another example is the idea that the use of retinal scanning can be seen as an 
invasion of privacy in some environments and cultures.  Skinner, Han, and Chang (2006) present a three-level information 
privacy taxonomy for collaborative environments to assist researchers in defining and clarifying information privacy 
components.  They suggest the three dimensions of computation view, content view, and structural view can be used to create 
better information privacy policies, practices, and privacy enhancing technologies.  We posit the following: 
H4:  The sensitivity to privacy of employees is negatively correlated with the number of ISP violations. 
Individual ethics is another aspect to include when considering individual characteristics.  In their study, Pierce and Henry 
(1996) conclude “that a formal company code of computer ethics has an impact on decision making; therefore, it is crucial to 
have and to communicate to all members of the organization a formal company code of ethics with provisions which address 
the use of computers and computer technology.”  The results of a study conducted by Peterson (2002) indicate that the 
interaction between computer guidelines and belief in universal moral rules (ethics) was significant.   Business professionals 
with a high belief in ethics exhibited high ethical intentions regardless of the knowledge about or existence of an ISP.  We 
posit the following: 
H5:  The ethics of employees is negatively correlated with the number of ISP violations. 
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Accountability is another important factor that could influence employees’ behavior. Accountability is not only the legal 
responsibility that comes with the job description, but also the moral responsibility.  Rao and Ramachandran (2007) caution 
that the appointment of a CISO clearly centralizes responsibility for information security in the organization.  If there is a 
CISO then employees may feel they are not responsible or accountable for security, instead they may feel the CISO is solely 
responsible and accountable.  As part of the training and awareness that takes place in companies, employees are often 
required to sign an acknowledgement statement which states they have read and understand the ISP.  Some companies will 
require this statement to be signed on an annual basis.  In one author’s experience, security was tested at the individual level 
in employee offices at night.  Sitting at the computer of an employee, a member of the security team would try to login as the 
employee.  They would try obvious passwords and look around the office including under the keyboard for anything written 
down that could be the password.  If the employee passed the test, a small card would be placed on the keyboard 
congratulating the employee for passing the test.  The employee would see the card the next morning and know they had been 
tested and that they had passed.  These tests served as a reminder of how important security was to the company and that the 
employee shared in the responsibility of keeping the company secure. We posit the following: 
H6:  The accountability (feeling of responsibility) regarding security of corporate assets is negatively correlated with the 
number of ISP violations. 
The Policy Factor 
The policy factor examines the information security policy (ISP) itself and includes the level of the severity of penalties, the 
level of impact the policy has on the work environment, and the scope and clarity of the rules in the ISP.   
Level of severity of penalties – In a press release by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007) about the 2007 Global State of 
Information Security report, it is stated that “most companies do not document the enforcement procedures in their ISPs.  
Less than one-third (31 percent) include enforcement mechanisms.”  If the level of severity of penalties is unknown, 
employees are less likely to take the policies seriously.  We posit the following: 
H7:  The severity of the penalty of violations of the ISP is negatively correlated with the number of ISP violations. 
Impact on work environment – The impact of ISPs on the work environment influences the behavior of employees as 
suggested by the Technology Acceptance Model of Davis (1989). Using the variables tested by Davis (1989) to explain what 
causes people to accept or reject information technology, we use those same variables to explore what causes people to 
accept or reject an ISP.  The two variables are perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use.  Davis defines perceived 
usefulness as the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system (in our case, ISP) would enhance his or her 
job performance.  Perceived ease of use refers to the degree to which a person belives that using a particular system (ISP) 
would be free of effort.  If employees perceive the ISP to assist them or remove some steps to their tasks, they may be more 
likely to follow the ISP; whereas, if employees perceive the ISP to add more steps or work to their tasks, they may be more 
likely to violate the ISP.   We posit the following: 
H8:  The negative impact of the ISP on the work environment is positively correlated with the number of ISP violations. 
Scope and clarity of the rules –  Whitman, Townsend, and Hendrickson (1999) state that in their study it is apparent that 
many individuals felt that if an organization does not specifically forbid the use of its computer resources for non-
organizational purposes, then such use should be permitted thus enforcing the idea of a need for a clearly defined ISP. 
Moreover, Moor (2001) suggests “new applications of computing technology require replacing policy vacuums with good 
policies supported by reasonable justifications.”  The study conducted by Peterson (2002) provides evidence that for business 
professionals with a low belief in ethics, the presence of a clear ISP had a positive effect on ethical intentions. Doherty & 
Fulford (2005) hypothesized that those organizations that have a policy with a broad scope are likely to have fewer security 
breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those organization that do not. Based on the above arguments, we posit 
the following: 
H9:  The scope (clarity of rules) of the ISP is negatively correlated with the number of ISP violations. 
The Management Factor 
The third factor examines the management issues of the level of management support for security, the enforcement level of 
policy penalties, and the expenditures on security resources including both technical and human resources. 
Management Support-Top management must show support for information security or it will not be taken seriously 
throughout the company.  One way support can be shown is to appoint a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO).  Support 
beyond appointing a CISO is considered key to the success of an organization’s security efforts (Posthumus and von Solms, 
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2004).  As von Solms (2001) states, “Without this management support, information security managers fight a very difficult, 
and often losing battle.” (p. 216).    Whitman (2003b) states “If employees know that management does not care about 
security, no training class teaching the importance of security and imparting valuable skills can be truly effective.”  We posit 
the following: 
H10: Management support for security is negatively correlated with the number of ISP violations. 
Enforcement Level of Penalties-“Having policy and being able to enforce it are totally different things.” (David, 2002, p. 
506).  In a press release by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007) about the 2007 Global State of Information Security report, it is 
stated that “most companies do not document the enforcement procedures in their ISPs.  Only 29 percent include collection 
of security metrics.”  If employees are not aware of penalties or if stated penalties are not enforced, employees will not take 
the ISP as seriously as the company intends or desires.  One of the respondents in a study conducted by Knapp, Marshall, 
Rainer, and Ford (2006) stated “Enforcement is without a doubt the most critical ISP issue.  While an organization can 
include whatever it wants in its security policy, this content is next to useless unless it is enforced.”  We posit the following: 
H11: The enforcement of the ISP is negatively correlated with the number of ISP violations. 
Expenditures on security-Rao and Ramachandran (2007) suggest the appointment of a CISO clearly centralizes responsibility 
for information security in the organization; however, appointment without authority and resources is not enough. They 
suggest that security leaders must be provided with sufficient authority and resources to accomplish security objectives.   
Expenditures may be required for both people and technology.  Hiring additional employees may be necessary to implement 
the ISP, train users, and implement technology.  Expenditures may be required on technology such as firewalls, encryption 
techniques, and virus protection software as well as special software to assist in automatically enforcing critical policy areas 
(David, 2002). Employees’ perceptions of IS expenditures will influence their behavior of ISP violations. For example, an 
employee who is aware of the capability of the IS department with respect to technology and staff skills, would be more 
hesitant to violate the ISP. Therefore, we posit the following:   
H12: The expenditures on information security resources are negatively correlated with the number of ISP violations. 
Figure 1 displays the proposed research model. 
The Moderating Effect of the Culture Factor 
The security issues become more challenging in a network economy due to the nature of such an environment. Additionally, 
the trends in globalization and outsourcing magnify the responsibilities of security managers. Moreover, the new generation 
of information systems applications, which primarily are Internet oriented, have complicated security management by making 
these systems more vulnerable to security breaches. These factors (network economy, outsourcing, globalization, and Internet 
applications) mandate exploring the culture effect on security management practices. For example, managers in a network 
economy deal with a greatly diversified environment with respect to IT infrastructure and human resources.  
To address the culture impact, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions will be used as moderators for the relationships identified in 
the proposed research model.  Hofstede surveyed 50 different countries (Hofstede, 1980, Hofstede, 1997).  He identified four 
dimensions that can be used to distinguish among different cultures: power distance, individualism, masculinity, and 
uncertainty avoidance. A fifth dimension (long-term orientation) was later added (Hofstede and Bond, 1988).  Among these 
cultural dimensions, we contend that uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, and power distance have the most 
direct impact on the relationship between the factors and the violations of the ISP. In the following section, we discuss the 
moderating effect of culture, as measured by three of Hofestede’s cultural dimensions on the proposed model as shown in 
Figure 2. 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) is defined as “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or 
unknown situations” (Hofstede, 1997, p. 113). The core values of cultures that exhibit higher uncertainty avoidance do not 
seem to support initiatives for information technology (Fandy 2000; Straub et al. 1997), as compared to cultures with lower 
uncertainty avoidance values. Cultures with higher uncertainty avoidance represent stability, risk avoidance, resistance to 
change, and strict control systems (Hofstede 1984). Individuals with higher uncertainty avoidance may be less prone to be 
proactive in exploring new information technology usage (Fandy 2000). Individuals high in this dimension are anxious about 
the future and actively avoid risk by devising various means of control including religion, laws, social plans, and written and 
unwritten rules. Therefore, individuals in higher uncertainty avoidance cultures will seek protection by sticking to existing 
patterns of  educational  processes that are  heavily dependent on  printed-information  sources (Fagan et al., 2004). Thus, for  
AlShare and Lane   Model for Explaining ISP Violations:  Cross Cultural Perspective 
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Toronto, ON, Canada August 14th-17th 2008 5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Proposed Research Model 
 
 
AlShare and Lane   Model for Explaining ISP Violations:  Cross Cultural Perspective 
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Toronto, ON, Canada August 14th-17th 2008 6 
this group of individuals, educational and training programs represent the means of controlling and avoiding risks (e.g., 
violating the ISP). 
In contrast, individuals with low uncertainty avoidance demonstrate risk-taking and tolerance to innovation and new ideas 
(Hofstede 1984).  Additionally, they are more apt to try things by utilizing their technical skills and they are willing to take 
responsibility for their risky actions. By having more education and training programs related to IS, they will have more 
opportunities and ways to explore new technologies, and therefore; they are more subject to violating the ISP. We posit the 
following:  
H1A:  Awareness, education, and training programs have a stronger positive (fewer violations) effect on violations of ISPs 
in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance. 
H2A: The level of technical skills has a stronger negative (more violations) effect on violations of ISPs in cultures with 
low uncertainty avoidance. 
Individualism/Collectivism  
Individualism (IDV) is defined as “the interest of the individual prevails over the interest of the group” (Hofstede, 1997, p. 
50). Individualism refers to the relationship between the individual and the collectivity that prevails in a given society. 
Persons in a culture high in individualism have loose ties, and everyone is expected to look after his or her own personal 
interests (Hofstede 1980).  The essential values of higher-individualism cultures emphasize autonomy, self-expression, 
independence, and performance-based reward achievement (Hofstede 1984, Akour et all 2006). As a result, they would be 
more cautious to have trust with people surrounding them such as their coworkers, more sensitive to privacy issues, more 
likely to make ethical decisions, and more receptive to accountability. Thus, these individuals are less likely to violate an ISP 
due to these characteristics.    
On the other hand, low individualism or collectivist persons have close ties among members, hold group values and beliefs in 
high regard, and seek collective interests (Hofstede 1980). Collectivist cultures focus on the group as the dominant structure; 
thus, values such as conformity, coordination, and sacrifices are upheld (Hofstede 1997). As a result, they are more likely to 
share resources and accept responsibility as a group. Therefore, they have more confidence and trust in people surrounding 
them (e.g., coworkers) and they are less sensitive to privacy. Additionally, they perceive accountability as a group 
responsibility and thus, individual’s mistakes are handled at the group level.  Based on the above arguments, we posit:  
H3A: Trust has a stronger negative (more violations) effect on violations of ISPs in cultures with high collectivism. 
H4A: Privacy has a stronger positive (fewer violations) effect on violations of ISPs in cultures with high individualism.  
H5A: Ethics has a stronger negative (more violations) effect on violations of ISPs in cultures with high collectivism. 
H6A: Accountability has a stronger positive (fewer violations) effect on violations of ISPs in cultures with high 
individualism. 
Power Distance 
Power distance (PDI) is defined as “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a 
country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1997, p. 28). Individuals high in power distance 
accept power and wealth differences more readily than individuals low in power distance who value equality of classes and 
people. In a business environment, higher values of power distance mean considerable dependence of employees on their 
supervisors; employees are unlikely to approach and contradict their managers directly.  In these cases, it is not unusual that 
an employee would provide or share information with others when the ISP prohibits sharing such information. Persons with 
low power distance demonstrate willingness to change and adjust to new work environments. Therefore, if the ISP 
dramatically impacts the work environment, then individuals with low power distance would adapt to new changes and not 
violate the ISP. Based on the above arguments, we posit: 
H7A: The severity of the penalty has a stronger positive (fewer violations) effect on violations of ISPs in cultures with 
high power distance. 
H8A: The impact of the ISP on the employees’ work environment has a stronger positive (fewer violations) effect on 
violations of ISPs in cultures with low power distance. 
H9A: The scope of the policy (clarity of rules) has a stronger positive (fewer violations) effect on violations of ISPs in 
cultures with high power distance. 
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H10A: Management support has a stronger positive (fewer violations) effect on violations of ISPs in cultures with high 
power distance. 
H11A: Enforcement of penalties has a stronger positive (fewer violations) effect on violations of ISPs in cultures with high 
power distance.  
H12A:  Expenditures on IS resources has a stronger positive (fewer violations) effect on violations of ISPs in cultures with 
high power distance. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Instrument Development and Data Collection 
An instrument based on the literature will be created to gather data on each of the variables. The instrument will be pilot 
tested and then administered to business professionals in a few select countries (e.g., USA, Mexico, and United Arab 
Emirates) that represent a variety of cultural sets. 
Statistical Procedure  
SPSS & LISREL software packages will be used to carry out the analysis. SPSS will be used to compute frequencies, means, 
standard deviation, reliability coefficients, and principle component analysis. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) approach 
will be taken with LISREL to validate the factor loadings identified in the principle component analysis. This validation will 
be conducted in the form of a measurement model consisting of all variables identified by the research model. A structural 
model will be then run testing the research model and hypotheses.   
Measure of Constructs’ Reliability and Validity 
Reliability and validity of the measures will be assessed by following the steps conducted by King and Flor (2008).  
1. Factor analysis will be performed on all items that measure the model constructs. Principle component analysis with varimax will be 
used. 
2. Based on the initial factor analysis, constructs with eigenvalues greater than 1 will be retained.  
3. Only items with loadings of at least 0.50 will be retained (Hair et al 2006).  
4. Items with loadings greater than 0.50 on two or more constructs will be investigated thoroughly.     
5. The above process will be repeated until we reached a stable measurement model. 
6. The corrected item-total correlation will be computed for each item using only the items belonging to the same construct. The 
minimum acceptable value according to Hair et al (2006) is 0.5. 
7. Cronbach’s Alphas will be computed for each construct. An item will be dropped if the deletion of that item would significantly 
increase reliability. Generally, reliability coefficients of 0.70 or higher are considered acceptable (Nunnally, 1978). 
8. A CFA using (Structural Equation Model) SEM will be performed on the final measurement model. LISREL will be used to carry out 
the analysis. Several goodness-of-fit indexes such as the Normed Fit Index (NFI), Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI), Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI), and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) will be used to assess the validity of the constructs.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper is an attempt to develop a model that explores the factors that affect the frequency of violations of information 
security policies (ISPs). Additionally, it examines the moderating effect of cultural attributes on the frequency of ISP 
violations. The ability to determine what influences an employee to respect or violate the ISP will assist companies in 
planning training and communications about the ISP within their company.  With the diffusion of the Internet and increase in 
e-commerce and outsourcing practices around the globe, the results of the study will be of great value to management around 
the globe.   
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